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█ Riassunto  Moralità e criminali psicopatici. Eticocentrismo, infermità mentale, libero arbitrio e la paura della 
decriminalizzazione - Le sentenze che oggi vengono pronunciate contro i criminali psicopatici evitano accura-
tamente di far leva su considerazioni “morali”. Solitamente l’attribuzione di responsabilità morale ai criminali si 
basa spesso sul concetto cognitivo di infermità mentale, in maniera tale che il giudizio morale sulla condotta mo-
rale dei “criminali psicopatici” in questi casi venga tendenzialmente sterilizzato. La posizione che qui vorrei 
proporre individua oscurità e limiti epistemici nelle teorie e nei metodi correntemente impiegati nelle società 
occidentali per alleggerire le responsabilità morali, le quali, pertanto, risultano in parte inaffidabili. Per suppor-
tare questa conclusione intendo far leva sui miei più recenti studi di carattere cognitivo, vertenti sulla dimen-
sione plurale dei contesti morali, sulla co-evoluzione geni/nicchia cognitiva e sul concetto di libero arbitrio. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Psicopatici; Moralità; Decriminalizzazione; Eticocentrismo; Violenza. 
 
█ Abstract  Present-day legal judgments of psychopathic criminals strongly avoid the exploitation of “moral” 
considerations. Currently, the attribution of responsibility to criminals often takes advantage of the cogni-
tive concept of mental incapacity so that, in these cases, the moral judgment about moral conducts of “psycho-
pathological” criminals is potentially extinguished. I contend that the theories and methods that are current-
ly used in western societies to discharge moral and legal responsibility are not clear in their epistemic struc-
ture and so partially unreliable. To support this conclusion I take advantage of my recent cognitive studies 
concerning the multiplicity of moral frameworks, the gene/cognitive niche co-evolution, and the concept of 
free will. 
KEYWORDS: Psychopaths; Morality; Decriminalization; Ethicocentrism; Violence. 
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█  Criminal psychopaths’ morality  
  and ethicocentrism 
 
HUMAN BEINGS LIVE WITH VARIOUS 
KINDS  of moralities, and possess and adopt 
different moral frameworks (e.g. religious, civ-
il, personal, emotional, etc., not to mention 
their intersections and intertwining) which 
they engage and disengage both intentionally 
and unintentionally, in a strict interplay be-
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tween morality and violence.  
There are also private moralities and habits 
– perceived as fully moral by the agents them-
selves, which we can call pseudo-moralities if we 
compare them to the translucency of the mod-
ern moral frameworks (that is, the way they are 
described in books about moral philosophy: 
Kantian, utilitarian, religious, ethics of virtues, 
feminist ethics, and so on). These personal mo-
ralities can be very easily observed not only as 
the fruit of the emergence of archaic moral 
templates of behavior in mentally healthy hu-
man beings –  that is, templates of possible 
moral  behavior trapped in a kind of hidden 
moral unconscious – but also in the case of vio-
lent psychopaths, who suffer from a personality 
disorder involving a profound lack of empathy 
and remorse, shallow affect and poor behavior-
al controls: psychiatrists and criminologists 
commonly describe how extremely personal – 
often disguised, fragmented, and depraved – 
concerns and convictions, which are envisaged 
as “moral” in the subjective estimation of crim-
inal psychopaths, are capable of triggering 
atrocious violence. 
Kent Kiehl, a psychologist who focuses his 
research on the clinical neuroscience of major 
mental illnesses (with special attention to 
criminal psychopathy, substance abuse, and 
psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia), 
usefully observes that psychopathy immedi-
ately affects morality: 
 
psychopathy is a personality disorder char-
acterized by a profound lack of empathy 
and guilt or remorse, shallow affect, irre-
sponsibility, and poor behavioral controls. 
The psychopaths’ behavioral repertoire 
has long led clinicians to suggest that they 
are “without conscience”.
1  [...] Thus, the 
psychopath presents clinically as a “walk-
ing oxymoron”. On the one hand, the psy-
chopath is capable of articulating socially 
constructive, even morally appropriate, re-
sponses to real-life situations. It is as if the 
moment they leave the clinician’s office, 
their moral compass goes awry and they 
fail seriously in most life situations.
2 
I must immediately stress that when Kiehl 
says that criminal psychopaths present a “lack 
of morality”, I prefer to suggest that they dis-
play a lack of our morality: the ethicocentric 
morality of a civil, cultivated observer. It 
seems that the criminal psychopaths’ acts are 
inconsistent with their verbal reports, as in the 
following case, still illustrated by Kiehl: 
 
I was working with a psychopath who had 
been convicted of killing his long-term girl-
friend. During his narrative of the crime he 
indicated that the trigger that set him off 
was that she called him “fat, bald, and 
broke”. After her insult registered, he went 
into the bathroom where she was drawing 
a bath and pushed her hard into the tile 
wall. She fell dazed into the half-full bath-
tub. He then held her under the water until 
she stopped moving. He wrapped her up in 
a blanket, put her in the car, drove to a de-
serted bridge, and threw her off. Her body 
was recovered under the bridge several 
days later by some railroad workers. When 
asked if what he had done was wrong, he 
said that he knew it was a bad idea to 
throw her off the bridge. When I probed 
further, he said that he realized that it was 
bad to actually kill her. This inmate was 
subsequently released from prison and 
then convicted of killing his next girlfriend. 
When I met up with him in the prison 
some years later, he indicated that his se-
cond girlfriend had “found new buttons to 
push”. He was able to admit that he knew 
it was wrong to kill them.
3 
 
In the case I just reported, it seems that a 
“morality” of killing is activated: the victim is 
sacrificed because she deserved  that punish-
ment in the light of the psychopath’s rigid mo-
rality. Being questioned, a morality of decency 
is advanced and verbally reported before the 
moral imperative not to take another person’s 
life (the wrong deed consists in throwing the 
body in the river) and finally, the morality of 
not-killing is verbally proposed (the wrong 
deed consists in the killing itself).   Magnani 
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In the perspective of disengagement and 
reengagement of morality, the first moral 
fragment (killing to punish) does not only 
trigger but also justifies violence, and plays a 
dominant role. However, it coexists with other 
moral fragments, that are reengaged and that 
sometimes disengage the dominant one. Many 
criminal psychopaths share multiple morali-
ties with mentally “sane” human beings, mo-
ralities which play the role of more or less 
freely chosen “reasons”, and they are involved 
in processes of disengagement and reengage-
ment; these various shifts seem anomalous in-
sofar as they display a strange sudden inter-
mittence of changes or long delays, a lack of 
stability within the various stages or an excess 
of stability, and in some cases the – so to say – 
special “individuality” of the adopted struc-
tured morality is predominantly at play. 
In the perspective of disengagement and 
reengagement of morality I have described in 
my  Understanding Violence,
4  the first moral 
fragment (killing to punish) does not only 
trigger but also justifies violence, and plays a 
dominant role. However, it coexists with other 
moral fragments, that are reengaged and that 
sometimes disengage the dominant one. Many 
criminal psychopaths share multiple morali-
ties with mentally “sane” human beings, mo-
ralities which play the role of more or less 
freely chosen “reasons”, and they are involved 
in processes of disengagement and reengage-
ment; these various shifts seem anomalous in-
sofar as they display a strange sudden inter-
mittence of changes or long delays, a lack of 
stability within the various stages or an excess 
of stability, and in some cases the – so to say – 
special “individuality” of the adopted struc-
tured morality is heavily at play. 
Kiehl contends that many other psychiat-
ric conditions (also some underlying criminal 
behaviors) are related to the aforementioned 
impairments in understanding moral behav-
ior: still, some are “unencumbered by moral 
imperatives”, as in the case of a schizophrenic 
who had killed someone he thought had im-
planted a monitoring device in his head.  
The usual interpretation of this supposed 
lack of morality is the following: in the case 
above, through our twenty-first-century aca-
demic or forensic ethicocentric screen, the 
criminal schizophrenic could not be con-
vinced that sacrificing his victim was a bad 
thing to do because he was unable to articulate 
that it was wrong to kill this person.  
I rather think that cases like this are better 
illustrated as characterized by the stability of a 
central and unique totally “subjective” moral 
framework, not sharable in a collective dimen-
sion, but still lived as “moral” by the human 
agent (i.e., if the schizophrenic could not be 
persuaded into acknowledging that his deeds 
were wrong, he probably kept thinking they 
were right, which is a moral stance). We are 
dealing with a kind of personal morality, as I 
have noted above, envisaged as a fully accepta-
ble dominant morality in a subjective estima-
tion, concurring with an anomalous absence of 
those multiple moralities which in my opinion 
characterize mentally healthy human beings.  
Relatively well-known research about 
criminal psychopaths stresses the fact that 
they do not discriminate between moral and 
conventional rules (for example, mere eti-
quette and various social rules, such as which 
side of the road to drive on, or how to move 
the pieces in a game of chess), unlike non-
psychopathic criminal and “normal” individu-
als. That is to say, the criminal psychopaths 
rate the wrongness and seriousness of the re-
spective violations in a similar way and as au-
thority-independent. Moreover, in a second 
experimental result,  criminal psychopaths 
tended to treat all rules as “inviolable” in an 
effort to convince the experimenter that they 
were mentally healthy.  
This interpretation resorts to postulating 
that the combined deficits of moral motiva-
tion and moral competence result directly 
from an emotional deficit. 
I consider this interpretation of results to 
be puzzling. I do not agree with it: first of all, 
conventional rules almost always also carry the 
moral values of a group (for example, etiquette 
is not simply comprised of morally-neutral 
rules), and so the experiment is biased by this Morality and Psychopathic Criminals 
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aprioristic assumption of the  experimental 
psychologist; second, the antisocial violent 
outcome is not necessarily due to impaired vi-
olence inhibition and to a general lack of emo-
tional concern for others. In the perspective I 
have outlined above, the data obtained can 
also be interpreted in terms of rigidity in the 
adoption of a given moral perspective and 
perseverance in applying the related violent 
(criminal) punishment, in lieu of a more open 
mechanism of moral disengagement and 
reengagement with other moralities, possibly 
less inclined to perform violent punishment.  
On the contrary, the supposed lack of 
moral emotion
5 seems to us intertwined – at 
first sight paradoxically – with the production 
of a lack of moral flexibility: in this sense crim-
inal psychopaths do not have problems with 
morality because they are practically “amoral” 
and lack moral (emotional) commitment, but 
instead because they are engaged in a kind of 
rigid  hyper-morality, which is not open to 
quick and appropriate revisions.  
One should wonder whether the emotion, 
in front of inflicted harm, is lacking because 
subjects are engaged in a rigid morality whose 
punishments are seen as just and deserved, or 
whether it is the lack of emotion that pro-
motes rigidity in the adopted moral perspec-
tive. It is not that criminal psychopaths do not 
master moral emotions and show reduced ac-
tivation of areas involved in attention and 
emotional processing, but it seems instead 
they just master their moral emotions that 
way: in sum, they are emotionally retarded just 
in the light of our moral judgment of “normal” 
individuals or non-psychopathic criminals!  
It is a real pity that psychiatric and psycho-
analytic traditions, still obsessed by an excess of 
positivistic commitment, mostly refuse to con-
sider the moral aspects of mental illnesses. In 
this sense psychiatrists often correctly complain 
about the tenacious persistence of a “moral-
istic” perspective in cases of childhood sexual 
victimization: there has been a tendency in 
psychiatric professionals to vilify those very pa-
tients who display abnormal sexual behaviors 
as a result of various kinds of sexual trauma.
6 
I argue that respect for the purported ob-
jectivity and freedom from moral bias in sci-
entific evaluation, diagnosis, and therapy on 
the part of the psychiatrist is one thing, but a 
lack of consideration of the moral life of crim-
inal psychopaths and their victims is a totally 
different thing. After all, morality is no longer 
the “other” of scientific rationality, like it has 
almost always been considered in the last two 
centuries (science deals with what is the case, 
whereas ethics deals with what ought to be), 
but a legitimate object of rational analysis. 
Prinz too seems perplexed: «These deviations 
suggest that they do not possess moral con-
cepts; or at least that their moral concepts are 
fundamentally different from ours».
7 
Here we may draw an interesting parallel 
with confabulating. Confabulation results 
from the inability to discard beliefs or ideas 
that are patently false. This is due to the fact 
that confabulators may lack the mechanisms 
enabling them to inhibit information that is 
irrelevant or out of date. The main effect is 
that the process of belief monitoring and revi-
sion cannot take place, and the confabulator is 
simply trapped within his bubble.  
I argue that something similar may happen 
to criminal psychopaths. That is, they would 
be trapped in a sort of moral confabulation 
resulting from the inability to discard a certain 
morality as unacceptable. In turn, such an ina-
bility would block the normal moral flexibility 
and so the process of moral reengagement. 
In sum, usually perpetrators of evil – those 
of sound mind and more particularly those 
who are mentally ill –  do not regard them-
selves, like Kant had already stressed
8  –  as 
wrongdoers. Paradoxically, they often see 
themselves as victims, for example treated un-
justly or aggressively, so that they think – per-
versely – they should deserve sympathy, sup-
port, and tolerance (if not praise). 
 
█  Mental incapacity, gene/cognitive niche co-
evolution, and the fear of decriminalization 
 
Present-day legal judgments of psycho-
pathological criminals strongly avoid the ex-  Magnani 
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ploitation of “moral” considerations and also 
tend to disregard the possible “moral” aspects 
of criminal conduct. Currently, the attribution 
of responsibility to criminals often takes ad-
vantage of the concept of mental incapacity, so 
that, in these cases, the moral judgment about 
moral conducts of “psycho-pathological” crim-
inals is potentially eliminated insofar as they 
are merely seen as affected by an overall men-
tal incapacity and this incapacity becomes the 
exclusive object of psychiatric and legal tech-
nicalities.  
One must note that the attribution of re-
sponsibility changes over time, as Lacey ob-
serves.
9  Nowadays, the state’s function in 
proving not only conduct but also individual 
responsibility (i.e., psychological and internal, 
capacity-based, requirements of mens rea, the 
guilty mind presupposed by criminal liability) 
is crucial for the legitimation of criminal law, 
not as a system of brutal, retaliating force but 
as a system of actual justice. 
What is at stake is that «the treatment of 
what we would today call mental incapacity 
defences, in which what would become the 
psychiatric profession was emerging as an au-
thoritative witness to the “facts of the mental 
matter”» is related to the fact that «in princi-
ple, the field of mental incapacity should re-
flect the most fully developed aspect of the 
“inner” or “psychological” model of criminal 
responsibility».
10 
In brief, it is evident that, in this perspec-
tive, the jury’s commonsense moral assump-
tions about madness, which characterized the 
evaluative/character based practice of the 
past, decline: currently, incapacity defenses 
which lead to judgments of non-responsibility 
focus on cognitive  incapacities (for example 
“lesions of the will”, found in the factual con-
ditions of mental, inner or neural states of in-
dividuals, where knowledge and consciousness 
are central), as opposed to volitional incapaci-
ties, that were considered as forms of moral 
insanity. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning 
that Lacey concludes by acknowledging a kind 
of  resurgence  of character-based patterns of 
attribution of criminal responsibility: 
emerging from their subterranean (though 
clearly important) position in the exercise 
of discretion at prosecution and sentencing 
stages, character-based principles are en-
joying a revival not only in “three strikes 
and you’re out” sentencing laws and pedo-
phile registers but also in the substantive 
law, particularly that dealing with terror-
ism, and in the operation of evidential pre-
sumptions, detention rules and the re-
newed admissibility of evidence of bad 
character. Why, we might ask, has charac-
ter suddenly become an acceptable explicit 
principle of criminalisation once again? 
And does this imply that its decline was 
more formal than real?
11 
 
The reason for this resurgence seems to be 
clear: further attention to capacity-based prac-
tices of responsibility-attribution better relates 
to the habit of considering individuals and their 
engaged capacities per se rather than their social 
status or appearance, that is to say, an attitude 
towards the whole practice of justice which de-
rives from certain standards of legitimation fol-
lowing the democratic acknowledgement of 
individual freedoms. 
 
Unfortunately, such a disposition would 
prosper in a world endowed with […] some 
confidence in its institutional capacity to 
deliver such individualised judgments while 
maintaining adequate levels of social con-
trol. Such a world has arguably never exist-
ed. But that individualising impulse has 
most certainly had a significant impact on 
the form of (some parts of) criminal law 
over the course of its “modernisation”. We 
might speculate that, at times when the sen-
timents underpinning norms towards equal 
liberties are fragile, perhaps because of fears 
about crime, or terrorism, or order more 
generally, explicitly character-based pat-
terns of attribution tend to enjoy a revival.
12 
 
In sum, the revival of “moral character” in 
criminal law seems related to the renewed 
emergence of a culture of control in our anx-Morality and Psychopathic Criminals 
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ious, fragile, and insecure world, which results 
in a potential greater criminalization, a recog-
nizable “overcriminalization”. Furthermore, 
one could notice how both the hypertrophic 
diffusion of psycho-pathological insights in 
the appraisal of criminal responsibility and the 
revival of character-based criminalization are 
easy ways of escaping a more burdensome, yet 
richer, practice of criminal justice: as I con-
tend, stressing the criminals’ moral character 
leads to the inescapable excess of overcriminal-
ization, but similarly, a psychopathology of 
criminals yields the perverted fruit of utter de-
criminalization  (at least from the point of 
view of social ideologies and everyday people’s 
mentality), resulting in the impossibility of 
any guilt ever being attested. 
It could be argued that many dangerous 
outcomes of the anomalous engagement and 
disengagement of moralities are caused by the 
“anomalous” engagement of more or less rigid 
personal, individual moralities – that only the 
agent himself recognizes as such –  and by 
their abnormal consecutive replacement: the 
reader could ask, how can a morality that is 
private still be a morality?  
She should note that morality can be frag-
mented and private – in the sense that it is not 
shared with some specific groups – because it 
is a vestigial remaining of more ancient moral 
concerns and axiological frameworks, which 
can be illustrated in terms of the speculative 
psychoanalytic concept of a collective uncon-
scious.  
For example, mobbing and bullying behav-
iors are surely not explicitly labeled as “moral” 
in our civil western countries, but still mental-
ly “work” in people and are perceived as good 
motivations for supposed-to-be “moral” be-
haviors, exactly as they worked fairly well in 
ancient times, for example when the scapegoat 
mechanism was a perfectly approved, effi-
cient, and justified conduct. Of course these 
behaviors were not necessarily labeled “moral” 
in the respective human groups, by the same 
meaning we now sophisticatedly and intellec-
tually attribute to it, but they played a decisive 
role in that cooperative sense which works in 
the case of coalition enforcement. 
In order to shed light on this issue involv-
ing an evolutionary dimension of human na-
ture, I take advantage of a different perspec-
tive on the hotly debated relationship between 
culture and nature. That is, I claim that the 
various archaic moral and non-moral aspects 
of the collective unconscious are more likely 
to emerge in connection with the impover-
ishment of the cognitive niches one lives in.
13 
That is, some moral templates relying on 
archaic modes of moral behavior are some-
how re-activated or re-enacted as the result of 
a “moral sensory deprivation” caused by the 
pauperization of the cognitive niche. The evo-
lutionary importance of the cognitive niche is 
given by the fact that it is responsible for 
providing and delivering additional resources 
for behavior control. Such additional re-
sources are part of an ecological inheritance 
system, which co-evolves along with the ge-
netic inheritance one
14  so that some plastic 
behaviors emerge augmenting the cognitive 
and moral repertoire furnished by evolution. 
In order to clarify this point from an evolu-
tionary perspective, and thus dealing briefly 
with the hotly debated issue related to the rela-
tionship between culture and nature, I have to 
indicate here the main points related to 
gene/cognitive niche co-evolution: general in-
heritance (natural selection among organisms 
influences which individuals will survive to pass 
their genes onto the next generation) is accom-
panied by another inheritance system which 
plays a fundamental role in biological evolu-
tion, where niche construction counts. It is the 
general inheritance system, also called ecological 
inheritance by Odling-Smee, Laland and Feld-
man. In this co-evolutionary process selection 
selects – so to say – for purposive organisms, 
that is, niche-constructing organisms. 
Given the fact there is (1) a co-evolution 
between genes and cognitive niches during 
human evolution and, especially, (2) because 
of their specific coupling which occurs during 
the life of any individual, as for example illus-
trated by so-called “Neural Darwinism”.
15 The 
methods that are currently used in western so-  Magnani 
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cieties to discharge moral and legal responsi-
bility seem to us unclear in their epistemic 
structure and so partially unreliable. 
Indeed, it is a fact that the brain is config-
ured in a certain way, and there is evidence that 
genetic or anatomic dysfunction (such as epi-
lepsy, delirium, dementia, thyroid dysfunction, 
cerebrovascular disease, encephalitis, diabetes, 
etc.) is present and may promote aggressive-
ness: the problem is that all this is often vaguely 
linked to a related lack or impairment of free 
will capacities, and nothing more, as I will bet-
ter explain in the last section of this paper. In-
deed, philosophers of free will frequently refer 
to mental and brain disorders as conditions 
that compromise free will and reduce moral re-
sponsibility, and so does forensic psychiatry. 
For example, what if some neural clusters 
were shaped during the personal history of an 
individual immersed in the aggressive morali-
ty of an honor culture, so that he presents 
anomalous distribution of excitations in areas 
related to aggressiveness (even detectable 
thanks to fMRI  methods) with respect to 
“normal” agents? Does this authorize us to 
state that the person who embodies those neu-
ral networks is not responsible for his violent 
illegal outbursts? Does the presence of certain 
genes, susceptible to exposure to unlucky cog-
nitive niches (for instance an abusive family), 
authorize the philosopher or the forensic psy-
chiatrist to subsequently hypothesize a lack or 
an impairment of free will in a criminal of-
fender? Furthermore, on another account, 
does the fact that his brain did not have the 
chance to be exposed to the cognitive niche of 
civil morality embedded in modern law and 
civil morality itself make the criminal offender 
morally and/or legally condoned?  
 
█  Can we freely decide to kill our free will?  
 
It is important to note that various charac-
teristics (not free from ambiguities) of free 
will can be proposed: (1) one must be able to 
act otherwise, i.e. one must have alternative 
possibilities; (2) one must be able to act or 
choose for a reason; (3) one has to be the orig-
inator (the causal source) of the action. Obvi-
ously, free will is always related to moral re-
sponsibility.  
Various constraints, standard and psychi-
atric, are believed to create problems for free 
will: for example, diminished capacity, intoxi-
cation, unconscious drives, infancy, entrap-
ment, duress or coercion, kleptomaniac im-
pulses, obsessional neuroses, desires that are 
experienced as alien, post-hypnotic  com-
mands, threats, instances of force majeure, var-
ious psychopathological states, physical and 
genetic impairments. These “excuses” typical-
ly find application in cases involving the igno-
rant, the misled, the coerced, the mentally in-
sane, the intoxicated, the biologically abnor-
mal. In these cases the actus reus tends to be 
conceded but mens rea is denied. 
Meynen concludes that philosophers of free 
will have paid scarce attention «to identifying 
the precise reasons why (certain) mental disor-
ders would diminish free will; a detailed analy-
sis of what it is that mental disorders do that 
has such an effect on free will is lacking»:
16 this 
happens in the case of defining criminal re-
sponsibility in real subjects (for example related 
to psychosis), which leads to the choice of non-
moral medical treatment instead of the fully 
moral/legal punishment which would normally 
follow a misbehavior. 
For example it is not clear when free will is 
partially compromised, and then when and to 
what extent responsibility can be actually dis-
carded. The empirical fact that legal or psy-
chiatric forensic technicalities can de facto 
solve ambiguities does not mean they are al-
ways based on serious scientific reasons. The 
typical “psycho” who killed his girlfriend acted 
for reasons as strong as moral imperatives, so 
in this respect his free will is preserved: his 
mental disorder does not affect this sense of 
free will. Similarly, can the capacity to choose 
alternative possibilities be jeopardized by men-
tal disorder? It is not clear. Finally, what about 
the  source/cause  of criminal violent action, 
which depicts the third sense of free will I 
have indicated above? Should the guilt be at-
tributed to the “proper person”, his mental Morality and Psychopathic Criminals 
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disorder, or his “biology”? 
Professional psychologists and the so-called 
behavioral scientists argue for a broader and 
richer range of ways in which psychology might 
be applied to criminal justice and, thereby, to 
law.
17 They always contend that further “scien-
tific” light can be shed not only on the problem 
of criminal responsibility, but also on eyewit-
ness identification, investigative interviewing, 
credibility assessments and lie detection, fact 
finding, evidence, decision making and its dis-
contents. They for instance stress that legal 
judgments, in particular, are influenced by 
short-cut, heuristic reasoning processes which 
have to be studied and clarified.  
I would like to note that psychology and 
other behavioral sciences do not have a privi-
leged disciplinary status, for instance over phi-
losophy or logic, that criminal justice “must” 
take advantage of. It is well known that too 
many psychologists just aim at promoting and 
diffusing their discipline as everywhere neces-
sary, especially in legal settings, even if scarce 
or counterproductive contributions result. 
Just to give an example, it is very sad that the 
study of abduction, so important in criminal 
investigation and in legal trials, is paradoxical-
ly disregarded by the psychologists them-
selves, even if studied in depth for example by 
philosophers, logicians, and AI  scientists.
18 
Even some psychologists acknowledge that 
 
[u]nfortunately whilst work on abduction 
and defeasible arguments is exciting the in-
terest of computational scientists interest-
ed in artificial intelligence it has provoked 
less interest amongst psychologists.
19 
 
A further interesting speculation may be 
advanced: what about a person who, in the 
presence of dysfunctional cognitive niches 
(poverty, abuse, and various other kinds of di-
rect or structural violence), has in the begin-
ning freely chosen and later on freely educated 
himself (and his brain’s neural networks) to 
perform violent physical aggressiveness, fear-
lessly and repeatedly. Indeed, after years, he 
might have developed a criminal psychopathic 
personality and he can be described as such by 
a psychiatrist. In such cases everyday language 
clearly expresses the same conclusion as that 
of the psychiatrist: “he is dominated by his 
impulses”, so it is not him that performed the 
crime but his mental illness. Then, just go to 
the medical treatment, son! 
A question arises: who (or what) trans-
formed him into a person who lacks or has 
impaired free will? “He himself”, as the cogni-
tive agent, his environment, his brain, his 
genes? I think we need more knowledge about 
puzzling situations like this. 
From this perspective we can see that peo-
ple can be considered as responsible for dis-
missing the ownership of their own destiny. 
But, what about the responsibility for violent 
actions committed after that initial moral 
“choice”, in the presence of the consequent 
impaired intentionality and free will? A simi-
lar problem is illustrated by Meynen himself: 
 
for instance, with respect to the person be-
ing the “genuine source of the action”, I 
mentioned that the mental disorder-rather 
than the “person proper” – could be con-
sidered the cause of a crime. Yet, this raises 
the question, what is the person proper 
and how can one distinguish the person 
proper from a mental disorder? This line 
of questioning will, sooner or later, bring 
up the question, what exactly is a mental 
disorder? – a central topic in the philoso-
phy of psychiatry. And if we focus on the 
“cause” of an event, then we must decide 
how to assess, among the manifold phe-
nomena that contribute to the occurrence 
of a particular event (e.g., actions), which 
of these contributory phenomena count as 
an authentic “cause”. For instance, did an 
addict’s original decision to use heroin 
cause the heroin addiction and thus also 
cause the actions that subsequently result-
ed from the heroin addiction? In brief, a 
central issue will be, how do the person 
proper and the disorder relate and how can 
they be distinguished when it comes to the 
initiation of actions?
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Could it help my analysis to consider a per-
son – for instance responsible for violent ac-
tions – who is supposed to be affected by a 
psychopathological lack or impairment of free 
will, yet who may have also freely brought 
himself to that condition?  
Maybe he chose a specific reaction in his 
coupling with cognitive niches, a reaction that 
later on led “him” to weaken or annihilate his 
own free will. From this perspective we can 
see that people can be considered as responsi-
ble for dismissing the ownership of their own 
destiny. But, what about the responsibility for 
violent actions committed after that initial 
moral “choice”, in the presence of the conse-
quent impaired intentionality and free will? 
Is this attitude still reminiscent of the old-
fashioned judgment based on moral character, 
that (it seems) we abandoned in the nineteenth 
century, or is it an actual problem we need to 
address when evaluating crimes? In which cases 
should we condone a criminal and the violence 
he perpetrated? If we condone his crime, but 
the criminal had performed the violent action 
in a state of free will, are we not in the presence 
of a kind of perverse disguised forgiveness, a 
dressed up excuse, which does further wrong to 
all the others criminals who could not make use 
of the same awkward forgiveness?  
Even if we do not have to fear the psychi-
atric legal decriminalization, which is anyway 
justified by the need for “civilizing” the crimi-
nal law, it is worth stressing that psychiatric, 
psychological, and neurological knowledge is 
often rudimentary, obviously continually 
changing during the standard research process 
of the involved academics, and often applied 
in settings where incompetence, excessive 
economic drives, avidity, and other variables 
endowed with possible violent outcomes are 
at play.  
What is really unfortunate, in my opinion, 
is that media and therefore public opinion be-
came absolutely comfortable with insanity 
pleas, in spite of being conspicuously ignorant 
as far as the knowledge of forensic psychiatry 
is concerned. Still, this taught them the capaci-
ty to roughly classify almost any violent or 
bloody actions as the fruit of criminal psycho-
pathologic individuals: this way, they are in-
clined to decriminalize such actions far too 
easily. 
In sum, for common people the violent 
subject is no longer responsible because he 
was the real victim of a kind of mental infec-
tion due to a “parasitic” moral niche (i.e. pov-
erty, a revengeful honor culture...), or because 
the real killer was “his biology” (an anomalous 
brain, for example). On one side the objective 
moral niche is responsible, on the other an un-
lucky biology: responsibility for violent behav-
ior is externalized and everyone  is happy to 
think that atrocious violence does not normal-
ly come from the core of an individual’s free 
will. As I further illustrated in a recent book,
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such “deliverance” from violence reflects a 
tendency to sterilize and disregard it, consid-
ering violence as something exogenous to our 
decisions, instead of embedded in the fabric of 
our very nature. 
 
█  Conclusion 
 
I have contended that the approach cur-
rently used in western societies to discharge 
moral and legal responsibility is not clear in its 
cognitive and epistemic structure, and should 
therefore be questioned. To support this con-
clusion I have taken advantage of my recent 
cognitive studies concerning the multiplicity 
and variability of moral frameworks and the 
gene/cognitive niche co-evolution, which can 
help by shedding new light on the concept of 
free will. Free will has in fact often been ex-
ploited to discharge legal responsibility in a 
debatable way. This leads us to propose a new 
analysis of the interplay between overcrimi-
nalization and decriminalization. 
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